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Can You Promise an Investor a Guaranteed Return or a Buyback? Put Options, Assured Returns and the FEMA Rules That Catch Indian Founders Out
A family office asks for 18% IRR guaranteed, or a promise that you will buy their shares back in five years. Founders often agree. Here is what Indian law allows, what it quietly voids, and what it can cost you personally.
Published 28 September 202611 min read
The short answer
An Indian startup cannot give a foreign investor an assured return. Under Rule 9(5) and Rule 21 of the FEMA Non-Debt Instruments Rules 2019, a put option is allowed only after a one-year lock-in and at a price no higher than fair value at the time of exit, with no guaranteed price fixed upfront. Domestic investors can have put options, but the company can only buy back within Section 68 limits, so the promise usually falls on the founders personally. A promise of guaranteed IRR is debt dressed as equity, and founders can end up personally liable for it.
Who this is for: Founders raising from family offices, HNIs, strategic investors or foreign funds who have been asked for a guaranteed return, a buyback promise or a put option, and founders reviewing older SHAs that contain one.
Summary: what most founders miss
- Equity is supposed to carry risk. Any clause that guarantees the investor a fixed return turns equity into something closer to a loan, and Indian law treats it that way.
- For foreign investors, put options are allowed but must be at fair value at the time of exit, after at least one year, with no price or return fixed at the start (FEMA NDI Rules 2019, Rules 9(5) and 21).
- For domestic investors, put options are generally enforceable as contracts, but the company cannot buy back more than Section 68 allows, so the obligation usually lands on the founders.
- A "promoter buyback guarantee" is a personal liability. The NTT Docomo and Tata Sons case shows how large these can become.
- Safer alternatives exist: a 1x liquidation preference, a drag-along after a long period, a fair-value put with no floor, or a structured instrument priced honestly as debt.
It usually comes up late in a round, often with a family office or a first-time investor. The term sheet is agreed, then a line appears: "The Promoters shall ensure an exit for the Investor within 5 years at a minimum IRR of 15%, failing which the Promoters shall purchase the Investor's shares at such price." Or the simpler version: "If there is no IPO or sale in 6 years, the company will buy back our shares at 2x."
Many founders sign this because it feels like a distant problem and because the investor presents it as standard. It is not standard in venture capital, and it is one of the most expensive clauses a founder can agree to. This article explains what Indian law allows, what it makes unenforceable, and where the risk actually sits: often with the founder personally, not the company.
Why do investors ask for guaranteed returns or buybacks?
Several kinds of investors ask for these terms, for different reasons.
| Investor type | What they ask for | The real concern |
|---|---|---|
| Family office or HNI new to startups | Guaranteed IRR, promoter buyback by a date | They compare startup equity to fixed deposits, bonds or real estate yields |
| Strategic investor or corporate | Put option if a commercial agreement ends | They invested for a partnership and want a way out if it fails |
| Foreign fund with an Indian exit concern | Put option on promoters if no IPO or sale by a date | Illiquidity of Indian private shares and a fixed fund life |
| Private credit or structured fund | Redemption, coupon, IRR floor | They are lenders using equity form for tax or regulatory reasons |
| Older PE-style investors | "Exit within X years or promoter buys at Y" | A norm from pre-2015 Indian private equity in promoter-led businesses |
Practitioner summary. Venture capital funds investing in early-stage startups rarely ask for guaranteed returns; it is more common in family office, strategic and structured deals.
The underlying problem is simple. If the investor gets a fixed return no matter what, they are not taking equity risk. The law then asks: is this really equity, or a loan pretending to be equity?
What does FEMA allow for foreign investors?
For any investor resident outside India, including NRIs investing on a repatriable basis and foreign funds, the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 set the boundary. The optionality framework was introduced by the RBI in January 2014 and carried into the 2019 Rules.
| Rule | What it says | What it means in practice |
|---|---|---|
| Optionality allowed | Equity instruments can carry an optionality clause (a put or call) | A foreign investor can have a right to sell to promoters or the company |
| Minimum lock-in | At least one year from allotment before the option can be exercised | No exit right in the first year |
| Exit price cap | Price at exit cannot exceed fair value at the time of exit, computed under an internationally accepted pricing method | The investor gets fair value, not a pre-agreed higher number |
| No assured return | The investor cannot be guaranteed any assured exit price at the time of investment (Rule 21) | A fixed IRR, minimum multiple or floor price is not permitted |
| Instruments with optional conversion | Optionally convertible or non-convertible preference shares and debentures are treated as debt | These fall under External Commercial Borrowing rules, not FDI |
FEMA (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019, Rules 9(5) and 21, as in force in September 2026. Fair value is certified by a chartered accountant, SEBI-registered merchant banker or practising cost accountant. Confirm the current text with your adviser before drafting.
So a put option in favour of a foreign investor is legal, but only a fair-value put. The investor can require the promoters or the company to buy the shares, but at what the shares are then worth, not at what was promised. If the company has done badly, fair value will be low, and the put protects the investor's liquidity, not their return.
What happened in NTT Docomo and Tata Sons, and why founders should care
The best-known case is NTT Docomo's investment in Tata Teleservices. Tata Sons had agreed that if performance targets were missed, Docomo could exit at the higher of fair value or 50% of its acquisition price. When Docomo sought to exit, the RBI declined permission to pay the higher amount. Docomo went to arbitration in London and was awarded about $1.17 billion in damages. In April 2017 the Delhi High Court enforced the award, treating it as damages for breach of contract rather than payment for shares at an assured price, and rejected the RBI's attempt to intervene.
Other rulings point the same way. In Cruz City 1 Mauritius v Unitech (Delhi High Court, April 2017), an award arising from a put option was enforced. In a 2020 Delhi High Court matter involving Alpha Tiger, damages in lieu of a put were allowed. The Supreme Court in IDBI Trusteeship v Hubtown (2016) upheld a structured arrangement that critics argued was an assured return in disguise.
Can you give a domestic investor a put option or guaranteed buyback?
For Indian resident investors, FEMA does not apply. The questions become company law and contract law.
| Promise | Is it enforceable? | The catch |
|---|---|---|
| Put option on the founders at a formula price | Generally yes, as a contract between shareholders | Founders must have the money; it is a personal obligation |
| Put option on the company | Only to the extent the company can do a buyback under Section 68 | Buyback needs free reserves, securities premium or proceeds of a different issue; capped at 25% of paid-up capital plus free reserves; one offer a year |
| "Company will redeem our shares at 2x" on equity shares | No, equity shares are not redeemable | Needs redeemable preference shares, which have their own rules and must be redeemed from profits or a fresh issue |
| Guaranteed IRR paid by the company | Risky; may be treated as a deposit or debt | Can breach deposit rules if structured as a promise of return on money received |
| Put and call options in SHA or AoA | Permitted by SEBI's notification of 3 October 2013, subject to conditions | The price must be lawful and actual delivery must take place |
Companies Act, 2013 (Sections 55, 67, 68, 73) and SEBI notification dated 3 October 2013 on contracts in shareholders' agreements. Private company options are generally treated as ordinary contracts; confirm the position for your structure.
Worked example: what a guaranteed IRR actually costs
A family office invests ₹5 Cr for 12.5% of a D2C brand at a ₹40 Cr post-money valuation. The SHA says: if there is no IPO or sale within 6 years, the promoters will buy the investor's shares at a price giving a 15% IRR.
| Scenario at year 6 | Company value | Fair value of the 12.5% stake | Guaranteed amount (₹5 Cr at 15% for 6 years) | Promoters must fund |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company doing well | ₹200 Cr | ₹25.0 Cr | ₹11.57 Cr | Nothing; investor prefers to sell at market |
| Company flat | ₹60 Cr | ₹7.5 Cr | ₹11.57 Cr | ₹11.57 Cr to buy a stake worth ₹7.5 Cr |
| Company struggling | ₹20 Cr | ₹2.5 Cr | ₹11.57 Cr | ₹11.57 Cr to buy a stake worth ₹2.5 Cr |
Swipe the table sideways to see all columns.
₹5 Cr × 1.15^6 = ₹5 Cr × 2.313 = ₹11.57 Cr. Illustrative. Ignores tax on the promoters' purchase and any interest on delayed payment.
The clause pays out only in the scenarios where the founders are least able to pay. In the struggling case, the founders must find ₹11.57 Cr personally to buy shares worth ₹2.5 Cr, a loss of about ₹9 Cr. The investor has taken almost no equity risk, but priced the deal as if they had.
| Structure | Investor return if company struggles | Investor upside if company does well | Who bears the risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equity with 15% IRR promoter guarantee | ₹11.57 Cr from founders | ₹25 Cr (12.5% of ₹200 Cr) | Founders personally |
| Plain equity at the same valuation | ₹2.5 Cr | ₹25 Cr | Investor |
| Venture debt or term loan at 15% | Principal plus interest from company, secured on company assets | None | Company, not founders personally (unless guaranteed) |
| Equity at a lower valuation (e.g. ₹30 Cr post) | ₹3.3 Cr | ₹33.3 Cr | Investor, compensated by more ownership |
Swipe the table sideways to see all columns.
Illustrative. The point is that a guaranteed IRR gives the investor debt-like downside and equity upside at the same time.
If an investor needs a fixed return, the honest answer is a loan or a structured instrument priced as debt, where the risk sits with the company and is disclosed as such. See Bridge Round, Extension or Venture Debt?.
What to offer instead of a guarantee
Most investors asking for a guarantee are really asking for one of three things: a path to liquidity, protection if the business fails, or protection if the founders misbehave. Each has a better tool.
| Investor's real worry | Alternative clause | Why it is better for founders |
|---|---|---|
| "I'll be stuck in an illiquid stake" | Fair-value put or ROFO after 6 to 8 years, or a drag-along if no exit by then | No fixed price; investor gets liquidity, founders are not guaranteeing value |
| "I'll lose money if it fails" | 1x non-participating liquidation preference | Investor gets money back first on a sale, but only from sale proceeds, not from founders |
| "Founders will walk away" | Founder vesting and lock-in | Aligns founders without personal financial guarantees |
| "Founders will commit fraud" | Indemnity for fraud and wilful misconduct only, capped | Personal liability limited to things founders control |
| "I need a fixed yield" | CCD with coupon, or venture debt | Priced as debt, sits with the company, disclosed to future investors |
See Participating vs Non-Participating Liquidation Preference and CCPS, CCDs, Convertible Notes or iSAFE?.
How to handle the request in a live negotiation
- Ask what problem the clause solves. Liquidity, downside or founder behaviour. Offer the matching alternative from the table above.
- Refuse any fixed IRR, multiple or floor price. For foreign investors, point out that FEMA does not allow it; for domestic investors, point out that it makes the investment debt in substance.
- If a put is unavoidable, make it fair value only. Set the valuation method (a named category of valuer, an internationally accepted method), with no floor.
- Make the company, not the founders, the obligor where possible, and limit it to what Section 68 allows. If founders must be parties, cap their liability at the value of their own shares, with no personal assets beyond that.
- Push the trigger date out. Seven to eight years, not three to five, and only if there has been no qualified exit offer the investor refused.
- Carve out investor-caused failures. No put if the investor blocked a sale or a follow-on round.
- Check how the next investor will read it. A Series A lead will ask for any guarantee to be removed, because it ranks the old investor ahead of them.
What diligence lawyers check
- Any clause in SSAs, SHAs, side letters or email agreements promising an exit, return or buyback at a fixed price.
- Whether foreign investors hold instruments with assured returns, which is a FEMA contravention that may need compounding.
- Whether optionally convertible instruments were issued to non-residents without ECB compliance.
- Personal guarantees by founders to investors, which they will ask to be released at the new round.
- Whether any "guaranteed return" was received as money that could be treated as a deposit under Section 73. See Loans From Friends, Family or Directors.
Case study
The 18% IRR that blocked a Series A
Packaged beverages brand, ₹22 Cr revenue, raising a ₹30 Cr Series A
Situation
Three years earlier, a family office had invested ₹6 Cr at seed. The SHA gave it a put option on the two founders from year five at a price giving an 18% IRR, and a first right on any sale.
What was missed
The Series A lead's lawyers flagged the put as a personal liability of about ₹13.7 Cr at year five, ranking the seed investor ahead of all later capital. The lead refused to invest unless the clause was removed.
What changed
The founders negotiated with the family office: the IRR put was replaced by a 1x non-participating liquidation preference, a fair-value ROFO from year seven, and a partial secondary of ₹2 Cr to the Series A lead at the round price, giving the family office some liquidity immediately.
Outcome
The Series A closed two months late. The founders were released from personal exposure that exceeded their entire net worth.
The lesson
A guaranteed return clause does not stay between you and the investor who asked for it. Every later investor will make you remove it, and the price of removing it rises with time.
Illustrative case. Figures are representative of patterns in Indian rounds, not a specific company. ₹6 Cr × 1.18^5 = ₹13.73 Cr.
Related: Participating vs Non-Participating Liquidation Preference and Family Office, VC or Strategic Investor?. Been asked for a guaranteed exit? Talk to us before you sign it.
Questions founders ask us
Can an Indian startup guarantee a return to an investor?
Not to a foreign investor: FEMA rules prohibit assured returns on equity instruments held by non-residents. For domestic investors a guarantee can be written as a contract, usually by the founders, but it turns equity into debt in substance and creates personal liability. It is rarely in the founders' interest.
Are put options legal in India?
Yes, with conditions. For foreign investors, FEMA allows a put after a minimum one-year lock-in and at a price no higher than fair value at the time of exit. For domestic investors, SEBI's 2013 notification permits put and call options in shareholders' agreements, and private company options are generally enforceable as contracts.
Can a company buy back an investor's shares at a fixed price?
Only within Section 68 of the Companies Act, which caps buybacks at 25% of paid-up capital plus free reserves, requires funding from free reserves, securities premium or a different issue, and allows one offer every 12 months. For foreign investors, the price also cannot exceed fair value.
What is a promoter buyback guarantee?
It is a promise by the founders personally to buy an investor's shares at an agreed price or return if there is no exit by a date. It is a personal liability that can far exceed the value of the shares when the company is struggling.
What happened in the NTT Docomo and Tata Sons case?
Tata Sons agreed to an exit price for Docomo that the RBI would not allow to be paid. Docomo won about $1.17 billion in damages in arbitration, and the Delhi High Court enforced the award in 2017, treating it as damages rather than an assured return.
Is a liquidation preference the same as a guaranteed return?
No. A liquidation preference gives an investor priority on sale or liquidation proceeds, paid from what the buyer pays, not from the founders' pockets. It does not guarantee any return if there is no sale.
Can a foreign investor get an IRR floor through a CCPS?
Not legally as an assured return on equity. A CCPS can carry a coupon and conversion terms, but a guaranteed exit price or IRR on exit is not permitted under FEMA. Instruments that are optionally convertible are treated as debt under ECB rules.
What should I offer an investor who wants downside protection?
A 1x non-participating liquidation preference, founder vesting, a fair-value put or right of first offer after six to eight years, or a drag-along if there is no exit by then. If they need a fixed yield, price the money as debt instead.
About the author
Written by the Alphamark Venture Partners team, a fundraising advisory firm helping founders raise seed, angel and pre-Series A rounds, with a focus on consumer, consumer tech and consumer AI. Figures are as of the date shown and are for general information; this is not legal, tax or investment advice.
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